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Tort Liability for Death by Poisoning
Lawrence Landskroner* .
L IABILy IN DEATHS resulting from accidental ingestion of
harmful material, toxic food, or drug product often is difficult
to ascertain. Lack of compliance with the Federal Food and
Drug Statutes,' or with the State or Municipal Code, often is the
critical problem. Determination of liability in these cases usually
rests on one of three major bases, in cases involving manufac-
turers and distributors:
(a) That the product is improperly labeled.
(b) That it is not labeled in compliance with the municipal,
state or federal laws.
(c) That it is an inherently dangerous product.
If any one of these bases is established, there is a breach or
omission of duty on the part of the manufacturer or distributor
in placing the said product on the market without proper safe-
guards for ultimate users.
The majority of such deaths occur accidentally, when the
decedent uses a product which is not properly labeled, or which
does not have adequate warnings on the label, or does not set
forth antidotes in the event that the product is taken internally.
A drug may have a given reaction upon one person and an
entirely different reaction on another. An individual's physical
characteristics may influence his reaction to the drug. This re-
action is influenced by many factors, such as age, individual
tolerance, dosage, or hypersensitivity to the agent.
For example, a youngster (attracted by the characteristic
minty odor), drinks a bottle of rubbing solution or methyl alcohol,
and eventually dies. This happens in the City of Cleveland on
an average of between ten and fifteen times per year. The
national death rate in such cases has increased to such a degree
that the Federal Government has enacted protective regulations,
contained in the Federal Food and Drug Act.2 These are de-
scribed below, and set forth a standard of care and a warning to
manufacturers and distributors of these products.
* Of the Cleveland Bar; Graduate of Vanderbilt Univ. Law School, after
attending Denison Univ. and Miami Univ.
1 U. S. Food and Drug Act, Title 21, U. S. C. A. And see, generally, Press,
Accidental Poisoning in Childhood, Thomas Co., Springfield, I11. (1956).
2 21 U. S. C. A., See. 502.07.
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Many manufacturers and distributors of liniment or rubbing
alcohol and similar compounds sold in Ohio do not list the two
antidotes required by Sections 3719.33 and 3719.99 of the Ohio
Revised Code. Therefore, one should check carefully for liability
in this type of situation. In the State of Ohio, the following stat-
utes are applicable:
Sections 3719.01 (General Code Section 12672-1) through
3719.99 regulate the sale of barbiturates, narcotics and drugs,
and prescribe the standards of care required of producers, manu-
facturers and distributors of poisons.
Section 3719.32, Regulating the Sale of Poisons, itemizes the
chief poisons, and penalties.
Sections 3719.33 and 3719.35 make provisions for labeling
and distribution.
There is a decided variance between Revised Code Section
3719.32 and Section 3719.33, where there are certain exceptions
allowed by the law, in setting forth what drugs or components
need not bear a poison label. But Section 3719.33 states that,
even though the word poison need not be spelled out on the
package, there is no exception covering the failure to place two
antidotes on a label, even if the word poison may be excluded
under the statute, where the compound actually is a poison.
Thus, the manufacturer or distributor must place notice of two
antidotes on the bottle, especially if the product or solution may
be attractive to children.
It is suggested that the following steps be taken in preparing
a claim for wrongful death by poisoning:
Send the product to a laboratory for analysis; or, where there
is a death involved, to the Coroner's office.3 Arrange for autopsy.
4
While the findings are being made by the Coroner's office, in-
vestigative work should be done in order to locate the source of
the product. Determine whether or not the product is "in inter-
.state commerce." Evidence must also be produced to show the
causal connection between the ingestion of the product and the
death. A subpoena duces tecum should be issued to the Coro-
ner's office, bringing in the Coroner's report and the findings from
the autopsy, in addition to the death certificate. The death cer-
3 See, Gerber, Postmortem Examinations, 6 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 194 (1957);
McCormack, The Pathologist and the Autopsy, Ibid., p. 205; Petition of
Sheffield Farms Co., 126 A. 2d 886 (N. J., 1956).
4 Ibid., n. 3.
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tificate may be admitted into evidence under Section 2317.42 of
the Ohio Revised Code.
The ruling case in Ohio on the admissibility of the certificate
of death is Glen v. National Supply Co.5 The case ultimately
rests on the certificate of death, chemical expert testimony, and
a physician's diagnosis as to cause of death.
In the Glen case, the death certificate stated that the cause
of death was cancer; and it was argued that allegation of poison
as the cause of death was nothing more than an opinion. Clearly,
this was true. Nevertheless, the court said the evidence of the
death certificate served only as prima facie proof of the facts
therein stated. Other testimony may be employed in order to
disprove any and all of the contents of the certificate. If such
testimony is introduced, it need only equal the prima facie
weight of the certificate's "testimony" in order to overcome its
effect. The weight of counter evidence is, of course, for the jury.
Three statutory authorities must be considered in the prepa-
ration of a trial brief concerning death due to ingestion of a
poison:
1. Is there a violation of a City Municipal Ordinance?
2. Is there a violation of the State law?
3. Is there a violation of the Federal Food and Drug Act?
Generally the Municipal Code of the City of Cleveland or
of other Ohio cities, and also the State law, continually refer to
the Federal Food and Drug Act for definitions, explanations, or
rules. Thus, the City of Cleveland's Code Section covering this
particular point, Ordinance 503.53, 6 states that: ". . . The stand-
ards of purity and labeling for food and drug products not
specifically defined in this code shall be those standards estab-
lished by the Federal Food and Drug Law of the Federal Security
Administration. In the case of meats and meat products the
standards shal be those of the Bureau of Animal Industry,
United States Department of Agriculture ... "
This requires search of both provisions even for basic defini-
tions. Thus, what is a drug? The term drug, as used in the Ohio
Code, is defined thus: ". . . all medicines for the internal or ex-
ternal use or inhalation, antiseptics, disinfectants, and cos-
metics." 7
5 Glen v. National Supply Co., 101 Ohio App. 6 (1954).
6 City of Cleveland Codified Ordinances, Sec. 503.53.
7 See, Food and Drug Act, 21 U. S. C. A., Sec. 7; and 14 Ohio Juris. 1051.
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The Ohio Revised Code states that:8 ". . it prohibits also
the offer for sale or delivery or possession with intent to sell or
deliver a drug which is misbranded as defined therein." In
addition, it says, "No person shall manufacture for sale or offer
for sale, or deliver or have in his possession with intent to sell
or deliver a drug or article of food which is adulterated within
the meaning of Sections 3715.01, 3715.02, through 3715.37, in-
clusive of the Revised Code" 9 . .. "or offer for sale or deliver or
have in his possession with intent to sell or deliver a drug or
article of food which is misbranded within the meaning of this
Section . . . and makes the manufacture, sale or offer of sale a
punishable crime." 10
It is apparent that the law aims to hold a manufacturer,
packer, distributor or retailer subject to what amounts to war-
ranty liability. But if the manufacturer or processor of food or
drugs does not deal with the ultimate consumer, and does not
as a matter of fact sell to him, the question of privity of con-
tract arises."
The courts have held that implied warranty runs with many
articles, such as food or drugs. An increasing number of juris-
dictions, including Ohio, now are recognizing liability on the
theory of implied warranty. 12 Ohio recently adopted the rule of
manufacturers' liability in tort, as for express warranty, where
advertising induces the purchase. This Court of Appeals decision
(Skeel, J.) has aroused widespread interest and approval.'3
Usually, exercise of due care by the defendant is not a
sufficient defense. In effect he is held to the duty of an insurer
that his goods are fit for human consumption and use. In the
Leach case 4 the court ruled that the jury could not speculate
as to the breach of warranty. Where courts have rested decisions
on warranty regardless of privity of contract, a more stringent
8 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 3715.08 (Gen. Code 5774).
9 Note how closely related are "adulteration" and "mislabeling" or "mis-
branding."
10 Ibid., n. 9. And see, Gielski v. State of N. Y., 3 Misc. (N. Y.) 2d 578 (1956).
11 See, 173 C. C. H. Reports 20, Vol. 2; Food, Drug and Cosmetic Reporter
(1956).
12 Implied warranty: Leach v. Joyce Products Co., 66 Ohio L. Abs. 296, 116
N. E. 2d 834 (1952).
13 See, Skeel, Product Warranty Liability, 6 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 94 (1957). See,
for comment on it, 2 N. C. S. (18) 141 (June 15, 1957); and see, Rogers v.
Toni Home Permanent Co., 139 N. E. 2d 871 (Ohio App., 1957).
14 Above, n. 12.
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liability for the manufacturer and dispenser results.' 5 Thus, a
court found that the Ohio Sales Code16 imposed an implied war-
ranty of merchantable quality on the retailer of a bottle of ale
which had exploded. It was held to be a dangerous instrumen-
tality and "adulterated" within the meaning of the Ohio Pure
Food Laws, 17 because it contained an ingredient injurious to
health. And in Kropar v. Procter and Gamble Company, 8 a wire
in a cake of soap injured the plaintiff. The Court ruled that
there was an implied warranty from the manufacturer to the
ultimate consumer.
Of this strict view, Commerce Clearing House Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Law Reporter said: 19
".. . one of the results of passing statutes on Pure Food and
Drug Laws has been to make a dispenser of food and bev-
erages subject to a more stringent liability. Suit is brought
on the basis of negligence of the defendant with an allega-
tion in the pleadings that the particular statute has been
violated."
The fact that there may not have been any contract between
the parties now may be of small consequence. In most instances,
the question in issue is, under the statute, "has the Act been
violated." If it has been, the next question is whether the viola-
tion amounts to negligence per se, or is merely evidence of neg-
ligence. Obviously, in jurisdictions where violation of the statute
constitutes negligence per se, the plaintiff has a much easier time
of it. If he proves a violation, even without proving negligence,
he has at least a case that can go to the jury.
The Federal Food and Drug Act 20 spells out the required
prominence of labeling. In addition, the various sub-sections set
forth other details. 21
Violation of a statute or ordinance may or may not be negli-
gence per se.22 The ruling case in Ohio concerning a "dangerous
15 Mahoney v. Shaker Square Beverage Co., 46 Ohio Op. 250 (1951); and
Skeel, above, n. 13.
16 Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 1315.14, in the Mahoney case, supra, n. 15.
17 Ibid., Code, n. 16, Title 37.
18 Kropar v. Procter and Gamble Co., 160 Ohio St. 489 (1954).
19 133 C. C. H. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law Reporter, Vol. 2, p. 2301.
20 Food and Drug Act, 21 U. S. C. A. 502.
21 Ibid., n. 20.
22 Claypool v. Mohawk Motors Co., Inc., 155 Ohio St. 8, 97 N. E. 2d 32 (1951).
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instrumentality" is White Sewing Machine v. Fiesel.23 This case
sets forth the doctrine of liability for a dangerous instrumentality
and uses the "foreseeable test." It means, in brief, that if the
occurrence could have been reasonably foreseen, or if the article
is inherently dangerous, a prima facie case is spelled out by
resulting injury. The plaintiff should then have an opportunity
to present his case to the jury as to the sufficiency of the facts.
Ruling Case Law states: 24 "If a merchant or dealer knows
an article is dangerous, it is his duty to properly label the ar-
ticle." Put otherwise this means that, if the natural proximate
result of the negligence can be reasonably anticipated, then the
court shall find for the plaintiff. Ruling Case Law2 5 also states:
"that injury that is foreseeable or could be anticipated rendered
the manufacturer liable therefor." Cases in point are Carter v.
Towne,2 86 McCrossen v. Hoyes," Hasbichs v. R. & M. Co.
2
a
In Levin v. Muser29 there was no label on the bottle, and the
manufacturer had full knowledge of the dangerous character of
the instrumentality. Plaintiff was therefore entitled to a verdict.
Ruling Case Law30 also says that "a manufacturer and retailer
owes a duty to the ultimate consumer to exercise caution in the
compounding and packing and labeling drugs and it is liable for
any injuries resulting from defective or mis-labeled products."
A case that neatly illustrates the rule is Mossrud v. Lee.
31
It involved a sale of a poison to destroy "Quackgrass," without
the label required by the statute. The seller's negligence in not
properly labeling the container was held to be the proximate
cause of the loss of cattle which ingested the compound. This
was sufficient to warrant submission of the case to the jury.
The Court stated that the reason for holding the manufacturer
of the "Quackgrass" responsible was that his failure to comply
with statutory requirements pertaining to labeling sufficed for
the jury to find reasonably that the defendant had lulled the
plaintiff into a false sense of security.
23 White Sewing Machine Co. v. Fiesel, 28 Ohio App. 152 (1927).
24 R. C. L., Sec. 8.
25 Ibid., n. 24.
26 Carter v. Towne, 9 Mass. 567 (1868).
27 McCrossen v. Hoyes, 143 Minn. 181, 173 N. W. 566 (1919).
28 Hasbichs v. R. & M. Co., 139 Wis. 357, 121 N. W. 157 (1909).
29 Levin v. Muser, 194 N, W. 672 (Nebr., 1923).
30 R. C. L., Sec. 801.
31 Mossrud v. Lee, 163 Wis. 229, 157 N. W. 758 (1916).
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One point which should be noted is that contributory negli-
gence is probably not a defense in an action for breach of war-
ranty.3 2 In theory, since warranty is an action in contract, not
in tort, the question of whether or not the plaintiff "was in the
exercise of due care" is immaterial; and the majority of the
Courts have held that this would not be a defense. The statute
of limitations is extended in a breach of warranty action past the
two years negligence limitation, to 6 years. Therefore, it is wise
to join both the negligence and warranty theories in the same
cause of action. If the plaintiff does not prevail under his negli-
gence action, the case still may be considered with respect to the
warranty theory. In Kropar v. Procter & Gamble Company
3
the court ruled that when inspection will not reveal the defect,
the ultimate consumer may sue the manufacturer on the war-
ranty theory.3 4
A manufacturer or distributor of a product which is used
in interstate commerce, and which comes within the meaning of
the Federal Food and Drug Act,3 5 the Ohio Code Sections, 6 or
pertinent City Ordinances, 37 is liable for violation of these or-
dinances and statutes, and such violation now usually seems to
be viewed as negligence per se.
In summary then: A death claim due to poisoning should be
checked for any possible violation of the local City Ordinances.
Then, check Ohio Revised Code Sections 3719.01 through 3719.99,
to see if there is a violation of the State Food and Drug Act per-
taining to narcotics, barbiturates and poisons. The next step, as
to statutes of this kind, is to see whether or not there is a viola-
tion of any local or general regulations covering prescription-
type drugs. Then see if the drug was used in interstate com-
merce. If it was, check the Federal Food and Drug Act Sections,
regulations and interpretations, including the congressional com-
ments, as set forth hereinabove.
32 Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382, 17 A. L. R.
649 (1920); Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kans. 823, 18 P. 2d 199 (1933); Friend v.
Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N. E. 407, 5 A. L. R. 1100 (1918);
Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N. W. 309 (1939).
33 Above, n. 18.
34 See also, 1 Belli, Modern Trials, Sec. 47 (1954).
35 Food and Drug Act, 21 U. S. C. A. 502.
36 Cited in text, above.
37 See above, Cleveland's provision.
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